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DETERMINANT OF BANK RUNS IN INDONESIA:
BAD LUCK OR FUNDAMENTAL?
Iskandar Simorangkir 1

Abstract

This paper examine the determinant of bank runs in Indonesia that includes economic fundamental,
bank performance, and self-fulfilling prophecy factors for all banks either in full sample periods between
years 1990 √ 2005 or in banking crisis periods between years 1997 √ 1998. The bank runs determinant
uses dynamic panel model from Arrelano-Bond. Estimation result shows that self-fulfilling prophecy, bank
monetary performance which is rentability and fixed credit ratio and macroeconomic condition which is
economic growth, inflation and real exchange rate influence bank runs in Indonesia. Bank runs determinant
in banking crisis between year 1997 √ 1998 also shows a result that is not really different from bank runs
determinant during full sample periods between years 1990 √ 2005.

Classification JEL:: C29, C33, G21
Key Words: Bank runs, Banking Crisis, Arrelano Bond Dynamic Panel
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I. INTRODUCTION
Bank runs is a phenomenon where many customers withdraw their money in a great
amount together and immediately in a bank because costumers do not believe that the bank is
able to fully pay the money on time2. Bank runs occurring in a bank would become a crisis if it
spreads to other banks (contagious effect). Bank runs and banking crisis have become a global
phenomenon and occurred repeatedly in both developed and developing countries within the
last decades. Bank runs and banking crisis even occurred frequently since monetary liberalization
in 1980s and 1990s (Davis and Karim, 2007). Even in the middle 2007 until today, world
money market is experiencing a global monetary crisis that came from subprime mortgage in
United States (US).
In a modern banking history, banking crisis had happened long before the World War I,
like bank runs (bank panic) and banking crisis occurred in United States in 1837, 1873, 1884,
1890, 1907, and 1933 (Calomiris, 2007). Research conducted by the IMF in 181 member
countries shows that since 1980 until mid-1996, there were 133 bank runs and a serious
banking crisis (Lindgren, Garcia and Saal, 1996). The next terrible banking crisis occurred in
1997/1998 in some of East Asian countries, including Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippine
and South Korea. The crisis started from the exchange rate crisis in Thailand and is contagious
to Indonesia and other East Asian countries and further developed into a banking crisis and
economic crisis (Bank Indonesia, 1998). The financial crisis occurred in the U.S. occurred again
in 2007/2008 and has grown into a global financial crisis and its impact is still experienced until
now.
In the case of Indonesia, bank runs also occurred repeatedly. In 1992, there was a bank

runs on several national banks resulting liquidated Bank Summa. Subsequently, in the year
1997/1998 there was bank runs that evolved into the worst banking crisis ever in the banking
history of Indonesia. The closure of 16 banks by the Government on November 1, 1997 has
resulted in reduced customer trust for the banks, especially the private banks where public
believed they had bad financial performance. The decline of trust for the banks encouraged
customers to massively withdraw their funds (bank runs). Furthermore, withdrawal at a bank
systemically3 spread (contagion) to other banks so it evolved into a banking crisis.

2 Definition of bank runs was expressed by George G. Kaufman on The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics in websitehttp://
www.econlib.org/library/Enc/BankRuns.html or in George G. Kaufman on ≈Bank runs: Causes, Benefits and Costs.∆∆Cato Journal 2,
No. 3 (Winter 1988): 559-88.
3 Systemic risk is a risk where a bank runs in a bank can trigger a bank runs to other banks or in academic literature it is always called
as risk giving contagion effect. The process of systemic occurrence or the contagion happened through self-fulfilling prophecy

https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol14/iss1/7
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v14i1

2

Simorangkir: DETERMINANT OF BANK RUNS IN INDONESIA: BAD LUCK OR FUNDAMENTAL?
Determinant of Bank Runs In Indonesia: Bad Luck or Fundamental?

53

Repeated phenomenon of bank runs and banking crisis are caused by the nature of
banks where they are the institutions that are vulnerable towards funds withdrawal by customers
on a large scale. The vulnerability is an impact of the operations of banks that transform shortterm liabilities, such as demand deposits, savings and time deposits into longer-term assets,
such as credit. Under these conditions, banks have always faced problems of maturity mismatch
so that it is very vulnerable to large-scale funds withdrawals (bank runs) by customers because
of the limited liquid assets owned by banks.
Subsequently, bank runs on one bank can cause a systemic risk, which is spreading to
other banks. Systemic risk occurs because customers at other banks do not know the information
about the condition of his/her bank (asymmetric information) so that customers think that their
banks also face the same problems, it makes customers massively withdraw their funds in the
banks. The same bank runs process also occurs in other banks, so there are many banks would
experience bank runs and ultimately lead to banking crises. Factors causing bank runs that
come from the worriedness (belief) of the customers due to the absence of information about
the bank»s performance is often called as self-fulfilling prophecy. Bank runs caused by a self-

fulfilling prophecy factor is a random event from the news that is not symmetrical (asymmetric
information) received by the customers (agent). The widely influential theory models were
developed by Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
Beside self-fulfilling prophecy factor, factors causing bank runs are fundamental factors,
both derived from macroeconomic and bank fundamentals (Kindleberger (1978), Gup and
Bartholomew (1999)). Shock that occurs in the economic fundamentals, such as the economic
contraction, the increase of interest rates, the exchange rate volatility, the asset impairment
and the increase of uncertainty in the financial sector, would encourage a negative effect on
the business activities of banks. Contraction or weakening economy may lead to an increase in
bad debts of banks and subsequently can lead to inability to pay the bank customer deposit
withdrawals because most of customer funds are embedded in bad debts.
Some researches show that banking crises that occurred in a country have generated a
huge loss for the economy and society (Hoelscher and Quintyn, 2003 and Hanson, 2005). The
obstruction of access to financing for business world would lead to an economic decrease or
contraction so it encourages an increase in unemployment. Besides, bank restructuring as an
attempt to recover the impact of the banking crisis also requires a large fiscal costs and will
ultimately be borne to the tax payer. The output loss experienced by the countries facing banking
crisis is various depends on how deep and long it is. Hanson (2005) conducted a study of the

output loss due to the banking crisis. The results of these studies argued that Indonesia suffered
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the output loss by 35% to 39% of GDP, Thailand by 26.7% to 40% of GDP, Korea by 10% to
17% of GDP in the crisis periods 1997 -2002, Japan by 4.5% to 48% of GDP in the crisis
periods in 1991-2005, Mexico by 10% to 14.5% of GDP in the crisis periods in 1994-2000 and
Hungary by 14% to 36.4% of GDP in the crisis periods in 1991 - 1995.
In connection with the costs incurred by bank runs and banking crisis, then this paper will
discuss the factors that affect the bank runs, fundamental factors or bad luck? Furthermore,
the second session will discuss the concept of theory that affects

bank runs. Session 3 will discuss the development of bank runs in Indonesia and section
4 will describe the empirical model and data. Empirical results from the study will be explained
in session 5, while the session 6 is the final part of the paper that will conclude the research
results and policy implications.

II. THEORY
In terms of its determinant, there are two main theories that explain the bank runs. The
first theory state that the bank runs occur due to the fundamental factors, both macroeconomic
and bank fundamentals (Kindleberger, 1978). While the second theory state that bank runs is
a random event because of the panic (self-fulfilling prophecy) of the customers due to imperfect
information (asymmetric information) on the problem of bank»s performance (Diamond and
Dybvig, 1983).
In fundamentalist theory, banks and macroeconomic fundamentals worsening may lead
to the occurrence of bank runs. Deteriorating bank fundamentals are, for instance, the decrease
of return on investment and the insolvency issues, while the deteriorating economic fundamentals
are, for instance, economic recession and high inflation. Kindleberger (1978) and Canova4
(1994) expressed that bank runs are endogenous towards the economic process and tends to
occur at the peak of expansion phase in the economic cycle. According to this theory, financial
condition becomes vulnerable at the end of the period of economic expansion since the
companies which are bank debtors have difficulty to pay their debts due to decline in corporate
profits.
In this model, bank runs are part of a cycle that can affect both the banking and real
sectors of economy. This theory expresses that under conditions of increasing economic cycle
(upturn); banks will increase lending (credit) to the real sector with basic expectations of better
4 Canova (1994) concluded Mitchell theory (1913), Fischer (1933), and Minsky (1977). See Fabio Canova≈Were Financial Crises
Predictable?∆. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. Volume 26, Issue 1 (Feb. 1994), 102-124.
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economic growth in the future. Furthermore, banks will have a great credit (highly leveraged)
and if the cycle of economic declines, the debtor cannot repay the loan. These conditions
generated banks liquidity problems and makes those banks do not have sufficient reserves to
cover losses.
The causes of bank runs can also be derived from bank fundamental factors (Gorton,
1988). Banks will have difficulty in providing liquidity to meet its customers fund withdrawals if
the banks have poor financial performance. The occurrence of losses, poor solvency, and poor
current asset quality generate retention of customer funds on bad current assets, such as bad
credit loans. Furthermore, these conditions resulted in the lack of liquidity available at banks, so
banks are always vulnerable to bank runs.
Meanwhile, the second theory states that bank runs occur due to random events caused
by bank customers panic (agent) and is not always related to economic fundamentals. Theory
model of the second group that is widely influential was developed by Diamond and Dybvig
(1983). This model explains that the bank runs that occur are a rational response of belief of
the agent due to asymmetric information about bank performance. If the customer (agent)
thinks that the banks do not have sufficient funds to meet the customer fund withdrawal, then

bank runs will occur. A bank will face massive withdrawal if many individuals believe that other
customers will massively withdraw their funds or often refer to self-fulfilling prophecy.
In this group, including« Calomiris and Gorton (1991), they expressed a combination
factors between self-fulfilling prophecy and the shock of banking assets is the cause bank runs.
Besides that, Chen (1999) expresses that beside self-fulfilling prophecy and liquidity factors,
the moral hazard also contributes to the occurrence of bank runs. Contagion in the discussion
of bank runs is often interpreted as a factor that is equal to the self-fulfilling prophecy because
contagion means that bank runs on a bank will affect the bank runs on other banks. The
influencing process from one bank to another occurred through a withdrawal transmission
mechanism of customers (self-fulfilling prophecy). Thus according to this theory, bank runs is
mainly due to bad luck instead of fundamental factors. From the empirical side, studies of bank

runs and determinants of banking crises have been a lot done. For example, Canova (1994)
conducted a study on the determinants of banking crises in the period 1864-1914 in the U.S.
with a probit model. The results of these studies indicate that the banking crisis in U.S. in that
period was caused by the impact of economic factors. Further research also concluded that
there would be a seasonal banking crisis that is influenced by economic cycles.
Research on the determinants of banking crisis as a whole by using data panel of developing
and developed countries is conducted by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998). The model
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used is a multivariate logit with the conclusion result that shows banking crises can occur if the
macroeconomic condition is weak (low economic growth and high inflation), high interest
rates, sudden capital outflow and high credit loan. Eichengreen and Rose (1998) conducted a
study of external shocks (international shock) towards banking crisis in OECD countries and the
results show that interest rates have a major influence, while economic growth has little influence
on the vulnerability of the banking crisis.
The above determinants of banking crises study is done using aggregate data from each
country (cross country) so there is the possibility of aggregation problems, such as denying
each other out factors among the banks that are aggregating. Concerning to these weaknesses,
McCandless, Gabrielli and Rouillet (2003) used individual bank data and dynamic data panel
model to determine the determinants of bank runs and banking crises in Argentina which
occurred in 2001. The research findings indicate that the determinant of bank runs that occurred
in Argentina is the factor of self-fulfilling prophecy, macroeconomic shock and worsening bank
fundamentals condition.

III. PROGRESS OF BANKING CRISIS IN INDONESIA
At first the crisis that hits Indonesia»s economy since 1997 is mainly triggered by the crisis
of the rupiah. The huge depreciation pressure of the rupiah exchange rate is mainly derived
from the factor of contagion from the crisis of the exchange rate of Thai Baht in July 1997.
Effect of contagion did not only hit Indonesia but also rapidly expanded into other Asian countries,
such as the Philippines, Malaysia and South Korea. Increasingly heavy pressure on the rupiah
depreciation forced Indonesia to remove managed floating exchange rate regime (managed

floating) to free floating exchange rate system on August 14, 1997. In order to avoid the
national economy from a deeper crisis as a result of the pressure of depreciation and capital
outflow, the government decided a package of economic policy in September 1997. Furthermore,
the program expanded to stabilization and economic reform programs supported by IMF, World
Bank, and ADB formally in November 1997. As the implementation of financial sector reform
program in order to make better banking system, then on 1 November 1997, 16 private banks
were closed.
Closure of 16 banks led to bank runs on banks where according to public perception
quite unreliable. Banks closure policy that should have been intended to recover the national
banking precisely resulted in a massive withdrawal of funds on non-government banks. Largescale withdrawal is due to the ruin of public trust towards banks due to bank closures policy.
The more widespread bank runs are also caused by the weak financial performance of banks,
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol14/iss1/7
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such as the increase in bad credit loans and declining banks rentability as the impact of
management of businesses that did not fully follow the nature of good governance. (Warjiyo,
2001 and Bank Indonesia, 19985). Besides, the rapid depreciation of rupiah resulted in ballooning
bank foreign debt denominated in rupiah. The condition was further aggravated by the absence
of guarantee program. During the absence of guarantee program and information about the
condition of banks (asymmetric information), bank customers, particularly private bank
customers, massively withdraw their funds and transfer them to a bank that considered better
and safer assets (fiat money) .
One month after the closure of 16 banks mentioned above (December 1997), the amount
of third party funds in national commercial private banks (BUSN) decreased by Rp 22.9 trillion
(11.94%). Withdrawal of funds started from the closure of banks and reached the highest
withdrawal in December 1997 and January 1998. The massive withdrawal declined since the
government provided a guarantee (blanket guarantee) in January 1998. However, when the
massive chaos occurred in May 1998, the number of banks experienced bank runs again.
In the period of banking crisis in 1997/1998, a large-scale withdrawals (bank runs)
commonly occurred in non-foreign6 exchange BUSN, frozen bank activities7, and frozen bank
operations8. Peak massive withdrawals on non-foreign exchange BUSN occurred in December
1997, January 1998, and May 1998. As an illustration, in December 1997, from 45 non-foreign
exchange BUSN, 25 bank experienced a decrease of third party»s funds by 10%, 17 banks
decreased by 20%, 13 experienced funds decline by 40%, 11 banks declined by 60%, and 6
banks experienced decreasing funds by 80% of the total amount of the previous month.
As in non-foreign exchange BUSN,»bank runs also occurred in frozen business bank (BBKU)
and frozen operation bank (BBO). The highest withdrawal occurred during November 1997
until January 1998, and March until May 1998. For instance, in November 1998, 26 banks
from 40 BBKU experienced third party funds decline by 10% from the total of previous month
third party funds, 14 banks experienced decline by 20% from the previous month amount, and
2 banks experienced decline by 40% from the previous month amount. Bank runs on BBO is
not much different from BBKU. In January 1998, from 10 BBO, 6 banks experienced third party
funds decline by 20% and 4 banks decline by 40%.

5 Annual report of Bank Indonesia in 1997/1998
6 Non-foreign exchange BUSNs is national private banks that are not allowed to conduct foreign exchange activities in their business
activities.
7 Frozen bank activities (BBKU) is bank where its business activities is frozen or is not allowed to have any business activities temporarily
or in a certain period
8 Frozen bank operation (BBO) is a bank where operational activities is frozen temporarily
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During November 1997 until January 1998 periods, on the contrary, third-party funds in
government banks increased by 9.6% in November 1997. Withdrawal of funds from foreign
banks is not much different from government banks. In November 1997, only one bank
experienced declined of third-party funds. Meanwhile, during December 1997 to January 1998,
it showed an increase by 6.8% in November 1997.
With these developments, the third party funds of firm banks and foreign banks increased
from respectively 42.8% and 7.2% in December 1997 to respectively 47.7% and 9.3% in late
January 1998. Instead, In contrast, the third party funds of foreign exchange BUSN and nonforeign exchange BUSN decreased from respectively 43.2% and 2.2% in December 1997 to
respectively 36.9% and 1.5% in January 1998 (Table 1). These developments indicated the
presence of the transfer of funds from private banks to government banks and foreign banks.

Table 1.
Percentage of Banking Third Party Funds
Group of Bank

Dec-96

Dec-97

Jan-98

Feb-98

Mar-98

Share (%)

Commercial Bank
1. State-owned Bank

36.0

42.8

47.7

47.0

46.6

2. Foreign Exchange Bank

49.7

43.2

36.9

37.1

37.6

3. Non-foreign Exchange Bank

5.5

2.2

1.5

1.9

2.3

4. Regional Development Bank

2.8

2.2

1.6

1.7

1.6

5. Joint Bank

1.7

2.4

3.0

3.0

2.8

6. Foreign Bank

4.1

7.2

9.3

9.3

9.2

Rural Bank*)

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.3

0.3

* Share of commercial bank
Source : Bank Indonesia

Beside third-party funds transfer to banks categorized as healthy (flight to quality), there
was also a transfer of funds into fiat money (currency), as reflected by the increase of fiat
money in January 1998 by 31.8% (Rp 9.045 trillion) compared to the previous month. The
increase is beyond the normal pattern of demand for fiat money, which is based on two years
latest data before the crisis, the average growth of currency was only 9.5% per year.
Banking crisis was aggravated again by the great depreciation of rupiah. In January 1997,
the rupiah against the U.S. dollar (U.S.) was in the position of Rp 2.396. The position of the
exchange rate continuously declined. In July 1997, the exchange was rate recorded in the
position of Rp 2599 per U.S. dollar, and in December 1997 by Rp 4650 per U.S. dollar. In 1998
the position of the exchange rate decreased drastically reaching the position of Rp 10,525 per
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol14/iss1/7
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Figure 1.
Development of Fiat Money and Exchange Rates

U.S. dollar in May 1998 and continued to weaken to a peak in June 1998 on the position of Rp
14,900 per U.S. dollar. From that position rupiah began to appreciate in December 1998 in the
position of Rp 8025 per U.S. dollar. Meanwhile, in 1999, the position of the exchange rate
tends to fluctuate and eventually rose in December 1999 by Rp 7100 per U.S. dollar.
Depreciation that occurred from January 1997 to December 1998 resulted in swelling of
the bank»s external debt obligations denominated in rupiah. Meanwhile, on the other hand
most of the foreign loans were invested in credit that generated rupiah (non-export), resulting
mismatch that aggravated the balance sheet of banks.
Withdrawal of bank funds on a large scale by the customer and the great depreciation of
the rupiah put a pressure on bank balance sheet. These conditions resulted in bad national
banking system performance. Banking performance degradation occurred in all financial aspects
of the banks, which includes the capital, asset quality, profitability, and liquidity. Performance
of capital (CAR) declined sharply since the crisis, as reflected by lower CAR of all banks from
9.19% at end December 1997 to -15.68% at the end of December 1998. Likewise the
performance quality of productive assets (KAP), which is measured by the ratio of productive
assets classified as non-current assets with the total productive assets, increased from 4.80%
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at the end of 1997 to 42.39% at the end of 1998, before decreased by 12.74% at the end of
1999 as the impact of the transfer of troubled bank loans to BPPN.
In line with the worsening KAP, then rentability performance, which is measured by the
ratio of profit to average assets (ROA), decreased from 1.37% in 1997 to -18.76% in 1998 and
-6.14% in 1999. Losses experienced by almost all banks were due to the high costs borne by
the banks, with a one-month deposit interest rate reached by 70% in September 1998. While
on the other hand, the KAP increases and the amount of credit granted decreased along with
the economic contraction (13.1% in 1998) and the increase of business risk due to social,
political, and security instability. In line with the decline in credit loan, the loan to deposit ratio
(LDR) of the bank also declined sharply from 86.42% at the end of 1997 to 72.37% at the end
of 1998 and only amounted to 26.16% at the end of 1999.

IV. METHODOLOGY
This study uses a dynamic panel model to analyze the influence of certain bank customer»s
behavior towards other bank customers through the changes on their saving on the bank.
Because of the limited information about his/her banks (imperfect information), when a large
decrease in third party funds occurred, the customer will interprete the bank is in trouble hence
trigger them to withdraw their funds (self-fulfilling prophecy). Institutionally self-fulfilling

prophecy can affect bank runs on other banks (systemic risk) or often referred to contagion9.
Thus the dynamic panel model that will be used in this paper can analyze simultaneously the
determinant of bank runs coming from the self-fulfilling prophecy, macroeconomic fundamentals
and financial performance of banks factor.
Dynamic panel model used in this study is Arrelano-Bond dynamic panel. Arrelano-Bond
model is used to overcome the problem of dynamic models on the fixed effect model (MET)
and the random effect model (MER). The correlation between lagged dependent variable and
the influence of individual effects can lead the use of MET and MER OLS estimators to be bias
and inconsistent, hence not robust. Formal model of dynamic data panel used to analyze the
determinants of bank runs in this paper is:
(1)
Where ∆Depit is the dependent variable in the form of monthly percentage changes in thirdparty funds of each individual bank as a proxy for bank runs.
9 Some writers, such as D»Amato, Grubisic, and Powell (1997) and Allen and Gale (2000) use»contagion term to self-fulfilling prophecy

https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol14/iss1/7
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v14i1

10

Simorangkir: DETERMINANT OF BANK RUNS IN INDONESIA: BAD LUCK OR FUNDAMENTAL?
Determinant of Bank Runs In Indonesia: Bad Luck or Fundamental?

61

Percentage change in a positive third-party funds means no bank run occurs, while the
negative one means there is a bank runs, where the size depends the on size of third party
funds. The use of ∆Depit as a proxy for bank runs in line with D»Amato, Grubisic and Powell
(1997) and McCandless, Gabrielli and Rouillet (2003). They show the percentage change in
third party funds is robust as a proxy for bank runs. ∆Depit is the lag one of dependent
variable, which serves to capture the influence of self-fulfilling of bank runs occurrence. With
the limited information obtained by customers about his/her banks (asymmetric information), a
decline of third party funds in their bank in the previous periods (t-1) will encourage customers
to a massive withdrawals or bank runs in the current period (t). This proxy are also used by
D»Amato, Grubisic and Powell (1995) and McCandless, Gabrielli and Rouillet (2003) on their
research and showed robust results. Bk is the k independent variables of the bank»s financial
performance. Financial performance used is a combination of the health rating of Bank Indonesia
in the form of CAMELS10. Fh is h dependent variable from macroeconomic fundamental condition
with macroeconomic variable.
In the estimation process of Arrelano and Bond (1991) model, we use instrumental variables
(IV) to obtain a robust result. In this dynamic panel model, we use k lag variable as independent

variable. By using first difference then specific effect from the banks can be eliminated, however
with first difference there would be a serial correlation between lag variable and difference
residual. To overcome this problem, Arrelano and Bond proposed to use lag explanatory variable
in level, including dependent variable as the instrument.
GMM estimation would be consistent if lag of the explanatory variable in level is a valid
instrument for explanatory variable in difference form. However, this is possible when the
residual is not correlated (no serial correlation) and each of independent variable is exogenous.
These two condition will be evaluated by second order correlation test and Sargan test to
identify any excessive restriction. With Sargan test, it can evaluate the joint model specification
and instrument validity.
Panel data covers 94 banks with monthly periods started from January 1990 until December
2005. This 94 banks consist of 7 government banks, 42 non-foreign exchange private banks,
and 10 foreign banks. The overall data panel of those banks was obtained from conventional
bank monthly report (LBU) of bank individual from Bank Indonesia. A complete explanation of
the data can be seen in the two tables below.

10 Bank Indonesia determined that CAMELS as the criteria of health rate assessment, which is C is capital, A is asset quality such as nonperforming loans (NPL), M is management, E is earnings or rentability, L is liquidity, and S is systemic risk. In connection with the
research focusing on bank performance, then finance performance used are Capital, Asset Quality, Earnings, and Liquidity, meanwhile
Management and Systemic risk are not used. It is in line with the previous research as mentioned above.
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Table 2.
Variables of Bank Performance
Variables Name

Measurement Method

Basic Consideration Theory

Capital Adequacy Ratio (CA)

The ratio between total capital
(paid-in capital + retained earnings
+ net income of the current year)
with total asset

The size of bank solvability. The better
bank solvability, the higher the
resistance towards bank runs (positive
coefficient sign)

The ratio of profit to total
assets (ROA)

Ratio between the current year
profit after tax and total assets

The greater the rentability, the better
the financial performance of banks
and the subsequent higher resistance
against bank runs (positive coefficient
sign).

The ratio of profit to equity
(ROE)

Ratio between the current year
profit after tax to equity (equity =
paid-in capital + Retained earnings
+ net income of the current year)

The size of Bank Rentability. The
greater the rentability, the better the
financial performance of banks and
the subsequent higher resistance
against bank run bank (positive
coefficient sign).

Ratio of Liquid Tool to Total
Assets (LIQ)

Ratio between liquidity (Cash and
SBI) and total current assets

The size of bank liquidity. The greater
the liquidity, the greater the liquid tool
owned by banks and further enhances
the ability of banks to tackle the
problem of bank runs (positive
coefficient sign).

Ratio of Credit to Third Party
Funds (LDR)

Ratio between total credit and the
third party funds

The size of liquidity. The greater the
LDR means the greater increase in
credit than public funds collected by
the bank so that liquidity that is
available gets smaller and further
increase the vulnerability to bank runs
(coefficient sign -).

Monthly Credit Growth
(GKREDIT)

Total credit growth of this month (t)
compared to the previous month
total credit growth (t-1)

Just like LDR, the higher credit
growth, the less liquidity-owned
banks thus it increases the
vulnerability to bank runs (the sign of
the coefficient is negative).

Non-Performing Loan (NPL)

Ratio between total non-current
loans (not current, doubtful and
loss) and total assets.

The size of Productive Asset Quality
(KAP). ). The worse KAP, the more
third-party funds retained in noncurrent so that the liquid tool owned
gets smaller and it further increases
the vulnerability of banks to bank runs
(negative coefficient sign).
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Table 3.
Macroeconomic Condition Variables
Variables Name

Measurement Method

Basic Consideration Theory

INFLATION

The rate of annual inflation in the stated
month

The higher inflation, then the economic
uncertainty that tends to increase bank
runs occur (negative coefficient sign).

LGDP

Economic growth is calculated from the
logarithm of the monthly Gross Domestic
Product. Monthly data is interpolated from
quarterly data using the quadratic method.

The decline in economic growth can
increase the credit default so it tends to
increase bank runs (positive coefficient
sign).

SBI

1 month SBI interest rate

The higher interest rates, the more
diminish the ability of customers in the
repay / pay off loans (performing loans
increased) thus it tends to increase bank
runs (negative coefficient sign).

LNT

Monthly percentage change in the
exchange rate / USD which is calculated
from the logarithm of the exchange rate
of Rp / USD.

The higher exchange rate volatility, the
higher the uncertainty that will leverage
the occurrence of bank runs (negative
coefficient sign)

GM2

Money supply money growth (M2)

The larger the money supply means
that the loose of monetary policy so
that the liquidity in the banking system
gets greater so it will lower the
vulnerability to bank runs (positive
coefficient sign).

GNFA

Net Foreign Asset monthly growth (NFA)

The greater the NFA means that M2
growth so that it will increase liquidity
in the money market / banking and the
sequel it can reduce vulnerability to bank
runs (positive coefficient sign).

IHSG

Percentage change in the Composite Stock
Price Index

The lower the stock price index, the
lower the price of the asset so that it
can lead to vulnerability to bank runs
(negative coefficient sign).

RSBUNGA

Real interest rates that are calculated by
subtracting the nominal interest rate of 1month SBI with annual inflation rate

The higher the interest rate, the higher
cost of funding of debtor so it
encourages an increase in bad credit
loans and further increases the
vulnerability to bank runs (negative
coefficient sign).
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Meanwhile, macroeconomic indicator (Fhit) includes inflation, economic growth, (LPDB),
1 month SBI interest rate, exchange rate (LNT), money supply growth (GM2), net foreign asset
growth (GNFA), stock exchange price index (IHSG), real interest rate (RSBUNGA) as described
below in Table 3. GDP quarterly data is interpolated to monthly.

V. RESULT AND ANALYSIS
5.1. Aggregately Bank runs Determinants (1990 √ 2005)
To estimate bank runs, we use Equation 1 and add dummy bank runs (dcrisis) on the
banking crisis occurred in 1997/1998.

(2)

This dummy variable addition is necessary to capture the occurrence of structural break
on the data, which may lead to the inefficient estimation result. As previously explained, following
D»Amato, Grubisic and Powell (1995) and McCandless, Gabrielli and Rouillet (2003), the
percentage change in a positive third-party funds means no bank runs occur, otherwise the
percentage change in third party funds that the negative means bank runs occur, where the
severity depends on the number of third-party withdrawals.
Since the model used is the GMM, the model robustness is analyzed by looking at the

moment condition. Arrelano and Bond (1991) suggested to use the serial correlation test of
Arrelano and Bond and Sargan as described in session 4. Based on the results of Arrelano-Bond
dynamic panel with one-step approach, there is a problem in a dynamic panel model (model 1),
i.e. there are problems with the auto correlation and over-identification in the variables used.
Considering this, the financial performance and macroeconomic indicators that exhibit
multicollinearity will not be used to avoid problems of specification inaccuracies and serial
correlation in the model. At the bank»s financial performance indicators, the ROE is not used
since we already have ROA. In addition, two variables have a close relationship so that it can
cause problems of multicollinearity. Likewise the credit growth variable (gkredit) is removed
because it is still associated with the loan to deposit ratio (LDR). For variable macroeconomic
indicators, the monthly growth of net foreign assets (GNFA) is not used because GNFA is a
factor affecting the growth of money supply (GM2). Besides, variable inflation, one-month
nominal interest rates of SBI, and real interest rates (RSBUNGA) will be separated with a distinctive
model. The separation is intended to avoid the relationship between interest rates with inflation
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that are interrelated. Taking into account the problems of multicollinearity, the model 1 is not
used to analyze the determinants of bank runs, but model 2 (model 1 with SBI minus ROE,
GKREDIT, GNFA, Inflation and rsbunga), model 3 (model 1 with INFLATION minus ROE, GKREDIT,
GNFA, SBI and rsbunga) and model 4 (model 1 with RSBUNGA minus ROE, GKREDIT, GNFA, SBI
and inflation).
The results of one-step model of 2, 3 and 4 are not robust based on Arrelano-Bond serial
correlation test, and Sargan tests indicated an over-identifying restriction problem. To overcome
these problems, we performe two-step regression of the Arrelano-Bond dynamic panel model.
This time, the two-step estimation results indicate that the model was robust. Furthermore the
F statistic of the three models was statistically significant at α = 1%, which means the model
can reject Ho: all independent variable coefficients are equal to zero. Thus, all independent

variables together influence the bank runs significantly. The results is presented in Table 4.
Sign of coefficient of the lag third-party funds (GDPK (-1)) is positive as expected. This
means decrease in third party funds in the previous period will lead to lower third-party funds
in the current period. The coefficient parameters (GDPK (-1)) in model 2, 3 and 4 are all significant,
as reflected by the p-value = 0.000. This significant coefficient indicates that the information
about bank runs can encourage the customers to withdraw their funds and can further lead to
the occurrence of bank runs on the other banks. The results are consistent D»Amato, Grubisic
and Powell (1995) and McCandless, Gabrielli and Rouillet (2003) which shows that self-fulfilling

prophecy factor is one of the causes of bank runs in Argentina in 1995 and 2001.
The results of the determinants of bank runs coming from the financial performance of
banks in the form of ROA, LDR, liq, NPL, and CA can be described as follows. The coefficient of
ROA has a positive sign so it accords to theoretical considerations as described in Table 2 and
Table 3, i.e. the higher the profitability of the bank, the better the financial performance of
banks so that it reduces vulnerability of the bank to bank runs. Concerning from its significance,
the p-value of ROA coefficient by 0.000, which means at α = 1% ROA significantly affects the

bank runs which is in this case it used a proxy variable used of bank runs is the change in bank
third party fund (GDPK).
LDR financial performance indicators show positive signs so it is not aligned as expected.
The LDR coefficient sign should have been negative because the higher the ratio the lower the
LDR liquidity available in the bank so the bank would be vulnerable to a massive withdrawal of
funds (bank runs). However, the LDR coefficient which is statistically significant affects the
bank run by the p-value 0.0000. The coefficient of LIQ also has a negative sign so it does not fit
with the expected sign, but it is statistically and significantly affects the bank runs. The explanation

Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2011

15

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Vol. 14, No. 1 [2011], Art. 7
66

Bulletin of Monetary, Economics and Banking, July 2011

of the opposite sign of the coefficient of two variables is mainly due to problems of limited
information from the customers in terms of the performance of banks (asymmetric information).
With limited information, the bank»s customers pay more attention to rates of return than the
publication of financial statements of banks in their fund withdrawals decision, as reflected by
compatibility of ROA coefficient. While the LDR and LIQ variable are not sensitive to the
withdrawal of third party funds.
Other financial performance indicators, the NPL showed a negative sign so that it fits
with the expected sign. Considering from its significance, it is statistically significant affecting
the bank run by the p-value of 0.000. Coefficient CA (capital adequacy ratio) has a negative
sign so it does not fit with the expected sign, but is statistically significant. As explained in the
LDR and LIQ, opposite sign of the coefficient is due to the limited information on the financial
statements of bank customers through publication so that changes in third party funds are not
sensitive to the capital adequacy ratio (CA). The significant variables of financial performance
show the healthier a finance of a bank, the less of the tendency of bunk runs.
The results of the determinant variables include macroeconomic conditions that include
LGDP, LNT, GM2, JCI, SBI, INFLATION and RSBUNGA will be described hereinafter. In all models,
economic growth (LGDP) has a positive sign so that it aligned as expected and is statistically
significant influencing bank runs on α = 1%. The exchange rate did not significantly affect the
bank run on all models. In model 2, the change in joint-stock index (IHSG) significantly affects
the bank run at α = 5%, but is not significant in models 3 and 4. Furthermore, IHSG and LNT
independent variable are separated by entering each variable in model 2, 3 and 4. Separation
was performed to detect the occurrence of multicollinearity between IHSG and LNT. The results
of dynamic panel with the separation of the two independent variables showed similar results,
i.e. IHSG remained significant and influence bank runs on the model 2 and has a negative sign
and did not significantly affect the bank runs in model 3 and 4. IHSG coefficient sign is negative
so that it is contrary to that expected. IHSG negative sign indicates that the placement of
customer funds in a bank is a substitution with the placement of funds in the stock market.
Other macroeconomic indicators that significantly affect the growth of bank runs are the money
supply M2 (GM2) with p-value of 0.000 in all three models.
SBI variables, INFLATION and RSBUNGA are estimated with separate models to avoid
multicollinearity problems. SBI using model 2, INFLATION with model 3, and RSBUNGA model
4. SBI coefficient on the model 2 is negative so that it aligned as expected and significantly
affects the bank run on α = 1%. Negative coefficient indicates the higher interest rates, the
greater the cost of funding of debtor so it encourages an increase in bad credit loans and
further increase the vulnerability to bank runs. INFLATION coefficient in model 3, did not
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol14/iss1/7
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significantly affect the bank runs. Meanwhile, the coefficient of real interest rates (RSBUNGA)
significantly affects the bank runs at α = 1% and has a negative coefficient that has been in line
with expectations. The significant coefficient indicates the greater the real interest rates, the
greater the cost of debtor funds and further increase the bad credit loans and the vulnerability
to bank runs. These results are consistent with research conducted by D»Amato, Grubisic and
Powell (1995) and McCandless, Gabrielli and Rouillet (2003) who argued that the interest rates
and high inflation is one of the causes of bank runs in Argentina in 1995 and 2001. These
results are also consistent to the theory proposed by Mishkin (1994), the higher inflation and
interest rates, the higher the uncertainty in the economy and will further increase the likelihood
of bank runs.

Table 4.
Results of Two-Steps Dynamic Panel Arrelano-Bond in all Banks (1990-2005)
Dependent
Variables
Gdpk(-1)
roa
roe
ldr
liq
gkredit
npl
ca
inflasi
lgdp
lnt
gm2
gnfa
sbi
rsbunga
ihsg
dcrisis
_cons
F-statistik
Tes Serial
Korelasi
- Order 1
- Order 2
Tes Sargan

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

.0499097 (0.000)
.0003161 (0.000)
8.69e-07 (0.000)
1.51e-07 (0.000)
-.0045987 (0.010)
2.91e-07 (0.124)
-.0000752 (0.000)
-8.32e-09 (0.000)
.010806 (0.523)
55.58811 (0.000)
-1.721723 (0.794)
.6664031 (0.000)
.0346286 (0.022)
-.1413058 (0.000)

.0558145 (0.000)
.0003511 (0.000)

.0546436 (0.000)
.0003656 (0.000)

.0568486 (0.000)
.0003308 (0.000)

1.51e-07 (0.000)
-.0039085 (0.000)

1.51e-07 (0.000)
-.0037416 (0.029)

1.50e-07 (0.000)
-.004143 (0.017)

-.000075 (0.000)
1.07e-08 (0.000)
-.01272767 (0.582)
57.0019 (0.000) 67.051549 (0.000)
-2.942458 (0.525)
-5.001888 (0.447)
.815951 (0.000)
.8681422 (0.000)

-.0000741(0.000)
-9.85e-0 (0.000)

-.0000744 (0.000)
-9.43e-09 (0.000)

59.29535 (0.000)
-8.2788 (0.092)
.9139102 (0.000)

-.1250546 (0.000)
-.0192167
-.0060853
-10.05823
-.3563791

(0.388)
(0.080)
(0.642)
(0.135)

-.0146106 (0.000)
9.268824 (0.607)
-.2951076 (0.299)

-.0090919 (0.041)
-27.51757 (0.367)
-.4164169 (0.088)

-.003091 (0.369)
-22.13916 (0.341)
-.4883353 (0.026)

6105.26

27447.17

15344.52

11575.41

0.0183 (p-value)
0.3223 (p-value)
1.0000 (p-value)

0.2939 (p-value)
0.2415 (p-value)
1.0000 (p-value)

0.2919 (p-value)
0.2423 (p-value)
1.0000 (p-value)

0.2922 (p-value)
0.2421 (p-value)
1.0000 (p-value)

Expected
Coefficient
Sign*)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

Note: Sign ( ) on coefficient is p-value
*) The basis of theoretical considerations the expected coefficient signs refer to Table 5.1 and Table 5.2
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Meanwhile, the dummy banking crisis 1997-1998 (dcrisis) indicates the coefficients did
not significantly affect the dependent variable (bank runs) on all models. These results indicate
that there is no problem of structural breaks in the data of change percentage in third party
funds so without using a dummy crisis, estimation of bank runs determinant model in this
dissertation has been quite robust.

5.2. Bank runs Determinants in the period of Banking Crisis in 1997-1998
Bank runs determinants obtained from the result of data panel regression above by using
monthly data from 1990 until 2005. However, as known in 1997 until the year 1998 there was

bank runs in Indonesia that has sparked a national banking crisis. In this regard, this research
would also like to see the determinants of bank runs from January 1997 until December 199811.
In addition, the analysis of bank runs determinants in the period 1997-1998 is a control variable
to use the change of third party funds as a proxy of bank runs. As explained in section 4, the
control variable is necessary given the changes of third party funds are not always followed by
the occurrence of bank runs.
In relation to have multicollinearity between independent variables, then to analyze the

bank runs determinants on the period of banking crisis in 1997-1998 used models 2, 3 and 4.
The estimation of Arrelano-Bond dynamic data panel model with one-step approach shows
bias result because the results of regression indicate the presence of serial correlation problem
and over-identifying problem in restriction equation. In connection with the problems, looked
for models that are not biased (robust), using two-step model of Arrelano-Bond dynamic panel,
the results can be seen in Table 5. GMM regression results show that the relationship between
the dependent variable with independent variable are statistically significant, as reflected by
the F values statistically significant at α = 1%.
Based on the results of GMM regressions, the three models showed a lag DPK are used
as a proxy of self-fulfilling prophecy has a positive sign and statistically significant with a pvalue of 0.000 or α less than 1%. The significant coefficient shows that the news of a reduction
in funds or bank run in another bank can cause to other customers in droves attracted funds in
the bank (bank runs). The results of study are in line with bank runs research in Argentina
conducted by D»Amato, Grubisic and Powell (1995) and McCandless, Gabrielli and Rouillet

11 Massive funds withdrawals has been experienced since Government change the policy from managed floating exchange rate to
freely freely floating exchange rate on 14 August 1997 and the wave of bank runs was getting bigger since the closure of 16 banks
on November 1997 until it gets recovered on August 1998
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Table 5.
The Result of Arrelano-Bond Two-Steps Dynamic Panel in All Banks (1997-1998)
Dependent
Variables
Gdpk(-1)
roa
ldr
liq
npl
ca
inflasi
lgdp
lnt
gm2
rsbunga
sbi
ihsg
_cons
F-statistik
Tes Serial
Korelasi
- Order 1
- Order 2
Tes Sargan

Model 2
.2974066
3.765414
-.0238338
-7.481348
.1041378
-.0627725

(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.010)

Model 3

Model 4

(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.952)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)

.298317 (0.000)
3.705551 (0.000)
-.239372 (0.000)
-7.53001 (0.000)
.107883 (0.000)
-.0647577 (0.013)

-.1088567 (0.000)
-.04066 (0.000)
-.4034315 (0.000)

-.032471 (0.000)
-.482142 (0.000)

-.0430248 (0.000)
-.4471285 (0.000)

1.10e+09

1.35e+09

1.11e+09

0.3382 (p-value)
0.3547 (p-value)
0.0538 (p-value)

0.3357 (p-value)
0.3533 (p-value)
0.0545 (p-value)

0.3389 (p-value)
0.3350 (p-value)
1.0000 (p-value)

6.666501 (0.000)
-8.495236 (0.000)
.6948838 (0.000)

.3010486
3.520904
-.0244307
-7.839653
.0986703
.001975
.5976495
3.044591
-14.44655
.7581463

11.35838 (0.000)
-8.50948 (0.000)
.682149 (0.000)
-.1117645 (0.000)

Expected
Coefficient
Sign*)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

Noted: () sign on the coefficient is the p-value
*) Basic theoretical considerations the expected coefficient signs refer to Table 5.1 and Table 5.2

(2003) which shows a factor of self-fulfilling prophecy is one of the causes of bank runs in
Argentina.
ROA financial performance variables have positive signs as expected and significant
influence on bank runs at α = 1%, with a p-value of 0.003. LDR has a negative sign as
expectations and significantly affect the bank run at α = 1%. Instead LIQ, NPL and CA have
opposite sign with expectations, with LIQ is marked by negative signs, NPL is positive and the
capital adequacy ratio is negative. The different sign of the coefficients are likely due to limited
customer information on the financial statements so that these three variables are not sensitive
to the withdrawal of funds from customers. The significant variables of the bank»s financial
performance show that better bank»s financial condition, and then less likely the bank runs
occur.
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The variable of macroeconomic indicator, in the form of economic growth (LGDP), the
exchange rate (LNT) and the money supply growth (M2) in all three models have signs as
expected and significantly affect the bank run at α = 1%. The significant coefficient of LGDP
shows that better economic growth, the less likely bank runs. While LNT significant coefficient
shows the higher the depreciation of exchange rate, then higher bank foreign liabilities
denominated in rupiahs and will further increase the likely bank runs. GM2 significant coefficient
shows increasing the money supply, then greater the liquidity available at banking and will
further reduce the possibility of bank runs. The results are consistent with the results of research
conducted by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Hardy and Pazarbasiouglu (1999) and
Ho (2004) which showed economic growth and exchange rates affect bank runs and banking
crisis.
Other significant macroeconomic variables affect the bank runs at α = 1% and has a sign
in accordance with the theory of bank runs is a 1-month SBI in model 2, Inflation in models 3
and real interest rates (RSBUNGA) in model 4. The significant of inflation coefficient, SBI interest
rates and real interest are consistent with the theories argued by Mishkin (1994) and D»Amato
research, Grubisic and Powell (1995) and McCandless, Gabrielli and Rouillet (2003) who argued
that the interest rates and high inflation is one of the causes of bank runs.
Meanwhile, the IHSG variable on all three significant models affect bank runs at α = 1%,
but the coefficient is negative that is inconsistent with the theory as described in Table 2 and
Table 3. The negative of IHSG coefficient shows that the third party funds in banking is a
substitute for the stock product.

VI. CONCLUSION
This paper provide the empirical test of bank runs determinants in Indonesia. Focusing
on the self-fulfilling prophecy, the dynamic panel result shows that the self-fulfilling prophecy
variable significantly influences the bank runs in Indonesia. The implication policy from this
result shows that the information of bank runs occurrence or the third party significant withdrawal
in a bank can influence the customer»s expectation to greatly withdraw money in other bank.
Regarding to the discovery, in the bank risk based supervision frame, supervisor authority needs
to map the sensitive banks toward self-fulfilling prophecy factor. The bank sensitivity mapping,
is inserted to the cycle of bank supervision in risk valuation frame toward bank individual so
that can be early prevented the contagious bank runs impact from one bank to another bank.
Besides, reliable communication management needs to be built to restore the worsen society»s
expectation toward a bank. Building customer trust toward bank needs also to be supported
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol14/iss1/7
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by government as the source of emergency funding in terms of bank runs occurrence that has
systemic risk. Support can be done by increasing the coordination on bank supervision, between
Bank Indonesia with government via existing financial system stability forum.

Caveat
This research is using lag of independent variable (third party fund change percentage) as

bank runs proxy. The use of this robust variable to get the self-fulfilling prophecy factor, however,
it is still possible to find better proxy.
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